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The term “terrorism” generally refers to physical acts of violence intended to inculcate 
fear.  It conjures up images of bombs exploding, bodies mutilated, and innocent lives lost.  
Behind the physical assaults, however, is another dimension of terrorism.  It is the 
information dimension, and terrorists exploit it every bit as much as the physical.  Their 
ultimate goal goes beyond the death and destruction they leave behind.  It is power and 
influence.  Terrorists seek a change, and their objective is to influence populations in 
ways that support that change.  To do that, they engage in both physical and information 
operations, and they integrate those operations together. 
 
The objective of this paper is to explore how terrorists use information operations (IO) to 
support their physical attacks and broader goals.  The paper uses as a framework the 
components of IO promulgated in U.S. Department of Defense doctrine.  While there is 
no reason to believe that terrorists follow U.S. military doctrine or even anything similar, 
the doctrine provides a conceptual basis for organizing the discussion.   
 
Most of the discussion focuses on al-Qa’ida and the transnational jihadist movement 
comprising individuals and groups loosely bound by al-Qa’ida’s radical Islamic ideology, 
but operating independently.  The movement is said to consist of dozens of radical 
Islamic groups, who have been trained and financed by al-Qa’ida or who collaborate with 
al-Qa’ida.  It includes thousands of Muslim militants who have trained together in 
Afghanistan and elsewhere (now Iraq), and an untold number who have been caught up 
by bin Laden’s worldview.1
  
Two principle types of sources are used.  The first is writings by terrorists and their 
supporters, including books, training manuals, online magazines, and information posted 
on websites.  Where original sources are not in English, translations and summaries are 
used.  The second is reports and analysis of terrorist actions that appear in news stories 
and scholarly publications.  Most of the sources are available online.  All are in the public 
domain.  No classified sources were used in this study. 
  
There is little scholarly literature on the topic of how terrorists use the full spectrum of IO 
capabilities, one exception being a recent article from former students and a colleague at 
my own institution, the Naval Postgraduate School.2  While that paper also looks at 
terrorist IO in terms of the components of IO set forth in U.S. military doctrine, it offers a 
different perspective than the one offered here.  In addition, there are publications that 
 1
address how terrorists use of specific methods of IO, for example, computer network 
attack. 
 
In the course of this research, I did not encounter any terrorist writings that specifically 
mention either “information operations” or “information warfare.”  Many of the writings 
refer to specific elements of what the Department of Defense (DoD) calls information 
operations, however, they are not characterized as IO, and the terminology used differs 
from that used by the DoD.  Thus, the view of terrorist IO presented here is based on an 
interpretation of terrorist writings and reports of their activities rather than any terrorist 
narrative about IO. 
 
After giving a brief overview of military IO doctrine, the paper examines how terrorists 
employ the three types of capabilities outlined in that doctrine: core capabilities, 
supporting capabilities, and related capabilities.  Emphasis is on how terrorists are using 
these capabilities today, not on how they might use them in the future.  Emphasis is also 
on terrorist use of modern technologies, particularly the Internet, in support of these 
capabilities. 
 
IO AND THE U.S. MILITARY 
 
U.S. military doctrine defines IO as the employment of the core capabilities of electronic 
warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and 
operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect 
or defend information and information systems, and to influence decision making.3  
Computer network operations comprise computer network attack, defense, and exploit.  
Supporting capabilities include physical destruction, information assurance, physical 
security, counterintelligence, counterdeception, and counterpropaganda.  Related 
capabilities consist of public affairs and civil military operations.  The capabilities are not 
entirely disjoint.  Information assurance, computer network defense, and operations 
security, for example, all involve protecting information from adversaries. 
 
IO consists of both offensive and defensive operations.  The Army defines offensive IO 
as the integrated use of assigned and supporting capabilities and activities, mutually 
supported by intelligence, to affect enemy decision makers or to influence others to 
achieve or promote specific objectives.4  Offensive IO seeks to create a disparity between 
the quality of information available to friendly forces and that available to adversaries.  
This is achieved through operations that destroy, disrupt, degrade, deny, deceive, exploit, 
or influence information, information systems, and decision making. 
 
Defensive IO is defined as the integration and coordination of policies and procedures, 
operations, personnel, and technology to protect and defend friendly information and 
information systems.5  Defensive IO ensures that friendly forces have access to timely, 
accurate, and relevant information while denying adversaries the opportunity to affect or 
exploit friendly information and information systems.  This is achieved through 
operations that protect against, detect, restore after, and respond to adversary threats.  All 
of the IO capabilities can support offensive and defense operations. 
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IO supports the informational instrument of national power, which along with the 
diplomatic, military, and economic instruments, serves to shape the security environment. 
It is employed across the full spectrum of conflict, from peace to crises to war.  During 
peace, IO helps shape the strategic environment or prepare for crisis or war.  During 
crisis, it supports contingency or crisis action plans.  During war, it serves to synchronize 
the information element of combat power with the other elements of combat power. 
 
IO CORE CAPABILITIES 
 
The five IO core capabilities of U.S. military doctrine are psychological operations 
(PSYOP), military deception, electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations 
(CNO), and operations security (OPSEC). 
Psychological Operations (PSYOP) 
 
Psychological operations are planned operations that convey selected information and 
indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, 
and ultimately to influence the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, 
and individuals.  The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and 
behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives.6
 
U.S. policy stipulates that PSYOP is to be conducted exclusively by the Department of 
Defense.  Because PSYOP targets foreign audiences, policy also requires that it be 
synchronized with the International Public Information Program (IPIP), which 
coordinates the dissemination of truthful information about U.S. foreign policy outside 
the U.S.  Information distributed through IPIP must not be misleading.  PSYOP cannot 
target U.S. audiences and must follow international law, treaties, and U.S. law, especially 
when conducted offensively.7
 
Although they do not refer to it as PSYOP, terrorists appear to understand and employ 
psychological operations.   In particular, many of their public communications carry a 
strong psychological element.  These messages target two principle groups: 1) supporters 
and potential supporters in their own geographic or global ethic/religious populations 
(e.g., Muslims), and 2) populations associated with enemy governments and their allies 
(e.g., Americans).  Messages are distributed through a variety of media, including 
leaflets, magazines, newspapers, books, audio and video recordings, radio and television 
stations, and the Internet.   
 
At first glance, it would appear that terrorist PSYOP differs from U.S. PSYOP by 
targeting local audiences as well as foreign ones.  However, this conclusion is not 
justified for at least two reasons.  First, my analysis of terrorist PSYOP is based on my 
interpretation of certain terrorist messages as containing a psychological component 
rather than on any categorization of the messages as PSYOP by the terrorists issuing 
them.  If I apply the same lens to all U.S. government communications, I would find 
numerous messages from the White House and other non-defense agencies with a clear 
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psychological element that are not labeled as PSYOP.  For example, a “100 Days” 
campaign ad for President Bush was said to be “fraught with a high-voltage emotional 
charge.” Showing an anonymous terrorist in the background, the ad was said to be 
“designed to appeal to one primal, irreducible emotion: fear.”8  
 
Second, terrorists send very different messages to their supporters vs. enemy publics.  
Issue 8 of Al-Qa’ida’s online training magazine, Al-Battar Training Camp, for example, 
distinguishes between messages that promote Islam and are positive to the organization 
from disinformation, which is designed to be detrimental to the enemies of Islam.9   
 
Nevertheless, whereas it is difficult to conclude that terrorist PSYOP differs practically 
from U.S. PSYOP by targeting local audiences, there are substantive differences in the 
intent and content of their messages.  Unlike U.S. messages, which are often designed to 
bring an end to violence and save lives, terrorist PSYOP is frequently directed toward 
promoting violence and threatening civilian populations with death and destruction.  
Suicide bombers are portrayed as martyrs rather than killers of innocent people. 
 
A good example of the violent nature of some terrorist PSYOP is the video showing the 
beheading of the American civilian Nick Berg in Iraq in May 2004.  Before the murder, a 
masked man reads a statement vowing more killings in revenge for the “Satanic 
degradation” of Iraqi prisoners at AbuGhraib.  He tells scholars of Islam that the time has 
come to put aside conferences and sermons and “lift the sword,” while warning mothers 
and wives of American soldiers that they “will see nothing from us except corpse after 
corpse and casket after casket of those slaughtered in this fashion.” He ends his speech by 
calling upon Muslims to “kill the infidels wherever you see them, take them, sanction 
them, and await them in every place.”  The man then pushes Berg to the floor and shouts 
“God is greatest” above his screams as another man saws off his head and holds it up for 
the camera.10  The video was subsequently posted on the Internet for anyone to see.  Al-
Qa’ida terrorists similarly used Paul Johnson’s beheading in Saudi Arabia in June 2004 
as a propaganda tool, posting a video of the captured aviation engineer on the Internet 
before the murder, and grisly photos of the brutal slaying after.11  
 
The Internet has become particularly popular with al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups as 
a means of PSYOP and propaganda.  According to Bruce Hoffman, al-Qa’ida’s website 
Alneda.com emphasized three themes: 1) the West is implacably hostile to Islam, 2) the 
only way to address this threat and the only language the West understands is the logic of 
violence, and 3) jihad is the only option.12  The site contained audio and video clips of 
bin Laden and justification for the September 11 suicide attacks against Americans.  
Poetry was used to glorify the martyrs and the importance of the struggle against the 
enemies of Islam.   
 
By some accounts, there are hundreds of jihad websites offering the latest news, images, 
and slogans of Islamic holy war.13  Jihad is presented as a mandate for all Muslims.   A 
book titled The 39 Principles of Jihad tells Muslims worldwide that they “must obey the 
Jihad against the infidels.” The book was published in 2003 on a website displaying al-
Qa’ida’s donkey and automatic rifle insignia.14  It includes elements of PSYOP, such as 
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the exhortation to take care of the families of the fighters or risk “misfortune and death by 
the hands of God.” 
 
Some of the jihadist PSYOP is specifically directed toward enrolling children in the 
jihad.  A radical Islamic website in the U.K. posted a rap video designed to inspire young 
people to take up arms against the West.  The Investigative Project, a counterterrorist 
research and investigative center, characterized the video as “undeniably entertaining, as 
professionally produced as any video you might see on MTV.  Consider the irony: radical 
fundamentalism, sworn to destroy Western culture and beliefs, uses that culture to market 
its hate.”15   
 
Hamas and Hizballah use their websites to reach children through cartoons and comic-
book style web pages, bedtime stories, and computer games.  Children are being taught to 
hate Jews and Westerners, and to take up arms against them.  “The children of stones are 
the heroes of today and tomorrow,” reads the caption on a Hamas site that stresses the 
glory of death while fighting the Jews.16  These Internet efforts are part of a much 
broader PSYOP campaign aimed at indoctrinating Palestinian youth in schools and 
communities.  The educational system is said to inculcate students with Jew hatred 
through every possible medium.17  In The 39 Principles of Jihad, Muslims are instructed 
to educate their children “to adore Jihad and the Mujahideen and to prepare themselves 
mentally for self-sacrifice for the sake of Allah.”18  
 
Terrorists use PSYOP to discourage their fellow Muslims from helping their enemies.  
After Saudi Arabia offered rewards up to $1.9 million for information leading to the 
arrests of suspects in the May and November 2003 suicide bombings, militants published 
a warning on a radical website: “We are warning anyone who cooperates with the 
authorities or gives the tyrants information leading to the arrest of one of the mujahideen.  
He will be liquidated.”19  
 
Jihadists direct numerous PSYOP messages to enemy populations.  The messages attempt 
to portray the terrorists as powerful and on the side of Allah (God), threatening death and 
destruction unless the enemy follows the desired path.  Following the September 11, 
2001 attacks and U.S.-led military operations in Afghanistan, Al-Qa’ida issued a 
“Message to the American People” on their English-Language website calling on 
Americans to denounce their Administration and follow Islam, threatening more terror 
until Americans stop their transgression or “one of us dies.”20  
 
Al-Qa’ida has exploited the fear of nuclear attacks in their threats against the United 
States.  According to Debka.com, the Milan daily Il Giornal ran a story about a video clip 
in which the terrorist group announced plans to destroy New York in a nuclear blast on or 
by February 2, 2004.21  The clip, which was found on an al-Qa’ida affiliated website, was 
accompanied by the message: “If God wills it, the end of America is near.”  In support of 
this ominous threat, al-Qa’ida’s No. 2 man, Ayman al-Zawahri, had claimed in a 2001 
interview that the terrorist group had purchased suitcase nuclear bombs from former 
Soviet nuclear scientists in Moscow and Central Asia.  Regardless of the veracity of the 
claims (Russian nuclear officials and experts adamantly denied that terrorists could have 
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bought Soviet-made nukes22), they serve to support al-Qa’ida’s goals of portraying power 
and inciting fear.  
 
A four-page “Message to the Spanish People” showed up on the Yahoo group Global 
Islamic Media (GIM) three months before the March 11, 2004 train bombings in Madrid.  
The PSYOP message aims to convince the Spanish to pull their troops out of Iraq and 
stop supporting the Americans.  It attempts to play on humanitarian feelings and raise 
sympathy towards the Iraqi people, while at the same time threatening attacks if Spain 
did not comply: “If the Spanish people wishes to save the blood of its sons let them 
withdraw from Iraq alive before we send them as burned corps to their families, and 
before they are trodden under the feet of our children who witnessed the Americans 
treading their fathers.”23   
 
Although that particular warning had little apparent effect, the fallout from the bombings 
themselves was more significant.  A few days after the horrific attacks, the Spanish 
people elected a Socialist Prime Minister who declared that Spain’s troops would 
withdraw from Iraq by June.  The terrorists rejoiced for bringing about a regime change – 
a change that was not expected based on earlier polls.  However, the change in voter 
preference may have been motivated by more than just the violence. Despite evidence 
linking the bombings to jihadists and al-Qa’ida in particular, the former Prime Minister 
attempted to blame the bombings on the ETA.24  As a result, he likely lost the public trust 
just before voters went to the polls. 
 
Because acts of terrorism have profound psychological effects within the information 
space (namely on the minds of the target population), they could be considered PSYOP 
within the domain of IO.  Emery, Earl, and Buettner take this approach in their analysis 
of terrorist use of IO.25  I prefer to view kinetic terrorist attacks as operations that 
influence their targets psychologically through the use of physical violence rather than 
information, and hence not as IO.  However, I do view the distribution of information, 
including text, images, audio, and video, that conveys threats of violence, such as the 
messages to Americans and Spaniards, or depicts acts of violence, such as the Berg 
video, as IO.  Jihadists also make this distinction.  In a 50-page report detailing their 
strategy to achieve a Western military withdrawal from Iraq, they wrote: “in order to 
force the Spanish government to withdraw from Iraq, the resistance should hit with 
painful attacks against its forces.  This will be accompanied by an information campaign, 
which would present the reality of the situation inside Iraq.  It is a must to exploit the 
coming general elections in Spain in March 2004.”  The Message to the Spanish People 
was part of the “information campaign,” while acts of violence against Spanish troops in 
Iraq and later in Madrid constituted the “painful attacks.”26
 
Terrorists are adept at integrating their physical acts of violence with IO.  They make 
audio and video recordings of the incidents for distribution over the Internet and on 
television.  Their violence becomes theater, staged for its psychological impact, and 
replayed played over and over again in the media as IO. 
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To enhance the emotional effects, terrorist sometimes fabricate information and images.  
In February 2004, Talon News reported that a Turkish-language website affiliated with 
Ansar al Islam had posted “shocking pictures of President George W. Bush and British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair lying in coffins after having apparently undergone autopsies.”  
The pictures showed large stitches covering their chests.27  Terrorists are likely to 
continue exploiting ever-improving technologies for creating false pictures. 
 
To convey an image of power over their adversaries, terrorists have fabricated stories of 
successful attacks.  For example, following the August 2003 power outage on the East 
Coast, Al-Hayat reported that they had downloaded a communiqué from the International 
Islamic Media Center’s website, in which al-Qa’ida claimed credit for the outage.  
According to Al-Hayat, the message said the operation “was carried out on the orders of 
Osama bin Laden to hit the pillars of the U.S. economy” and that the brigades of Abu 




Military deception comprises actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military 
decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby 
causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the 
accomplishment of the friendly mission.  It is used to make an adversary more vulnerable 
to the effects of friendly force weapons, maneuver, and operations.29  
 
Terrorists use deceptive means to protect their operations and intentions.  For example, in 
order to hide intentions and weapons, a suicide bomber appears to be just another person 
boarding a bus or entering a crowded theater or street market.  The September 11 suicide 
hijackers similarly blended into their communities, dressing and behaving much like 
average Americans.  
 
During a search of an al-Qa’ida member’s home, Police in the U.K. uncovered an al-
Qa’ida training manual that instructs its members on various forms of deception, 
including the use of covers.30  A section on forged documents, for example, deals with 
the use of false identity cards and passports.  Members are instructed to use photographs 
without beards and to not carry documents for multiple identities at the same time. 
 
There does not appear to be much evidence of terrorists staging elaborate ruses and 
feints, such as used by militaries.  Their deceptions appear to be aimed more at 
concealing activities rather than leading their adversaries down a false path or into a trap.   
Electronic Warfare (EW) 
 
Electronic warfare is any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and 
directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy.  It has 
three major components: electronic protection, electronic warfare support, and electronic 
attack.  Electronic attack refers to operations that use electromagnetic energy, directed 
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energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the 
intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability.  It includes 
jamming.  Electronic protection refers to operations that defend against adversary 
electronic attacks.  Electronic warfare support refers to operations that search for, 
intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of radiated electromagnetic energy for 
the purpose of threat recognition, targeting, planning, and conduct of future operations.31
 
I have not found much evidence of terrorists engaging in EW, although there have been 
some reports of terrorists using jamming.  For example, the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Columbia (FARC) is said to have jammed all ground-to-air communications over a 
jungle area where government troops were deployed to capture the FARC leader.  The 
jamming prevented the air force from mounting an effective defensive action in support 
of the ground troops.32
Computer Network Operations (CNO) 
 
Computer network operations comprise computer network attack, computer network 
defense, and related computer network exploitation-enabling operations.   
Computer Network Attack (CNA) 
Computer network attack is operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information 
resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks 
themselves.33  It includes cyber attacks that deface websites or tamper with other data 
stored on computers, computer viruses and worms, and denial-of-service attacks against 
Internet servers or particular e-mail accounts on those servers. 
 
Numerous cyber attacks have been attributed to hackers affiliated with terrorist 
organizations or sympathetic to terrorist causes.  The first reported incident of this nature 
took place in 1997 when an offshoot of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
claimed responsibility for “suicide email bombings” against Sri Lankan embassies over a 
two-week period.  Calling themselves the Internet Black Tigers, the group swamped Sri 
Lankan embassies with about 800 emails a day.  The messages read, “We are the Internet 
Black Tigers and we’re doing this to disrupt your communications.”34
 
About two years later, another terrorist group engaged in cyber attacks.  During the 
Kosovo conflict, the Serb Black Hand (Crna Ruka) group reportedly crashed a Kosovo 
Albanian web site, justifying their actions with the statement “We shall continue to 
remove ethnic Albanian lies from the Internet.”  They also planned daily actions against 
NATO computers and deleted data on a Navy computer.35
 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has provoked numerous cyber attacks from hackers on 
both sides of the conflict.  According to the security firm iDefense, at least two of the 
pro-Palestinian groups involved in a cyber intifada in late 2000 had terrorist 
connections.36  One of these was UNITY, a Muslim extremist group with ties to 
Hizballah.  After pro-Israeli hackers attacked Hizballah’s website, the hackers launched a 
coordinated, multi-phased denial of service attack, first against official Israeli 
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government sites, second against Israeli financial sites, third against Israeli ISPs, and 
fourth, against “Zionist E-Commerce” sites.  The other group, al-Muhajiroun, has ties to 
a number of Muslim terrorist organizations as well as bin Laden.  The London-based 
group directed their members to a Web page, where at the click of a mouse members 
could join an automated flooding attack against Israeli sites that were attacking 
Moqawama (Islamic Resistance) sites.  iDefense also noted that UNITY recruited and 
organized a third group, Iron Guard, which conducted more technically sophisticated 
attacks.  According to a Canadian government report, the group’s call for cyber jihad was 
supported and promoted by al-Muhajiroun.37
 
A more recent call for cyber attacks against Israeli computers appeared on a website 
affiliated with Al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, in 2003.  Under the 
heading “the electronic jihad,” someone opened a discussion about using computer 
viruses to inflict harm on Israel.  The idea was to load a virus-infected page onto a 
website and then take steps to attract as many Israeli visitors as possible to the site.38   
 
In early 2004, Internet Haganah, a website devoted to confronting Islamic terrorists on 
the Internet and stopping their use of the net as a communications and propagation tool, 
reported that the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade was planning a cyber attack against the El Al 
website.39  Internet Haganah also reported that its own website was the target of jihadists.  
A message posted to a Yahoo! group attempted to recruit 600 Muslims for jihad cyber 
attacks against Internet Haganah.  The motive was retaliation against Internet Haganah’s 
efforts to close down terrorist-related websites.  Muslim hackers were asked to register to 
a Yahoo! group called Jehad-Op.40   
 
According to the Anti-Terrorism Coalition (ATC), the jihad was organized by a group 
named Osama Bin Laden (OBL) Crew, which also threatened attacks against the ATC 
website.41  Founded in 2000 by an al-Qa’ida member living in Holland, since 2002 OBL 
Crew has been under the leadership of a San Diego man calling himself Ibn Shahbaz.  
Although the promised attacks against ATC either failed or never materialized, OBL 
Crew hackers did take over the Asian Hangout forum on June 26, 2004, which they used 
for recruiting. 
 
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack against the United States and follow-on U.S.-led 
war on terror provoked a cyberwar involving hackers all over the world.  Although none 
of the hackers claimed to be terrorists, three groups of Muslim hackers formed the Al-
Qaeda Alliance Online: GForce Pakistan, the Pakistan Hackerz Club, and Anti India 
Crew.42  In one of their defacements, GForce Pakistan said they stood by bin Laden even 
as they condemned the September 11 attacks.  “Osama bin Laden is a holy fighter, and 
whatever he says makes sense,” they wrote on a U.S. website on October 17.  The 
modified Web page warned that the group planned to hit major US military and British 
Web sites.43  Subsequent defacement did in fact show up on “.mil” sites.  However, the 
hackers were apparently concerned they would be regarded as terrorists, as a later 
defacement said, “GForce Pakistan is not a group of cyber terrorists.”  Calling themselves 
“cyber crusaders,” they asked for “PEACE for everyone.”44   
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The examples involving Muslim hackers reflect ways in which the global jihad 
movement has incorporated the concept of cyber attacks as a form of electronic jihad into 
its strategic objectives.  Sheikh Omar Bakri Muhammad, the London-based Islamic cleric 
who heads al-Muhajiroun and has ties to bin Laden, told Computer World in November 
2002 that al-Qa’ida and other radical Muslim groups were actively planning to use the 
Internet as a weapon in their holy war against the West.  He noted that the military wings 
of al-Qa’ida and other radical Islamic groups were using and studying the Internet for 
their own operations.  He said that “in a matter of time, you will see attacks on the stock 
market,” and that he “would not be surprised if tomorrow I hear of a big economic 
collapse because of somebody attacking the main technical systems in big companies.”45
 
The use of cyber attacks is also appearing in al-Qa’ida publications and training 
programs.  Principle 34 of The 39 Principles of Jihad directs computer experts to “use 
their skills and experience in destroying American, Jewish and secular websites as well as 
morally corrupt web sites.”46
 
In late 2003, an affiliate of al-Qa’ida announced the opening of Al-Qa’ida University for 
Jihad Sciences on the Internet, with a college on electronic jihad.  The announcement was 
circulated by the Islamic Information Center, which in the past had disseminated 
statements by bin Laden on the Internet.  The other colleges include the technology of 
explosive devices, booby-trapped cars and vehicles, and media jihad. The announcement 
noted that there were already specialists in electronic Jihad, one of the colleges of the 
university.47   
 
Terrorists or their sympathizers have reportedly hijacked Internet servers in order to share 
documents.  While this might not be considered an “attack,” it nonetheless represents 
unauthorized use of computers.  In one such case, 70 files were uploaded to an 
unprotected FTP (file transfer protocol) site run by the Arkansas government for its 
contractors.  A person calling himself Irhabi 007, or Terrorist 007, put links to the files on 
a message board belonging to al Ansar.48  The motivations for using hijacked sites could 
include access to free storage and avoidance of detection by authorities. 
 
Imam Samudra, one of the terrorists convicted in the October 12, 2002 Bali bombings, 
advocates the use of computer attacks to raise funds for terrorist activities in his 
autobiography Me Against the Terrorist!  In a chapter titled “Hacking: why not?” 
Sumadra offers some rudimentary information on hacking, particularly as it applies to 
credit card fraud (“carding”).  Evidence found on his seized computer showed he at least 
had made an attempt at carding.49   
 
These developments show that terrorists have begun to integrate cyber attacks into their 
thinking, strategies, and operations.  Further developments are likely as computers and 
the Internet achieve higher penetration rates throughout the world, and young hackers and 
computer enthusiasts join the ranks of terrorists. 
 
In examining terrorist use of CNA, I have intentionally avoided calling any of it 
“cyberterror.” 50  The main reason is that the attacks have not been terrorizing.  Unless 
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and until they become so, it seems more appropriate to label them simply as cyber attacks 
rather than as some peculiar form of terror. 
Computer Network Exploit (CNE) 
Computer network exploitation consists of enabling operations and intelligence collection 
to gather data from target or adversary computers and networks in support of CNA.51  It 
includes the use of scanners to identify network access points and vulnerabilities.   
 
It is reasonable to assume that the same terrorist-affiliated hackers who conduct CNA use 
CNE to map their targets before attack.  However, hackers do not distinguish CNE as a 
separate activity from CNA; it is considered to be part of the attack process. 
Computer Network Defense (CND) 
Computer network defense consists of defensive measures to protect and defend 
information, computers, and networks from disruption, denial, degradation, or 
destruction.52  In short, CND refers to operations that protect against adversary CNA.  It 
includes the use access controls, encryption, authentication, firewalls, intrusion detection, 
anti-viral tools, audit, security management, and security awareness and training. 
 
Because terrorist organizations use the Internet and maintain websites, they cannot ignore 
CND.  Hamas and Hizballah, for example, have had to defend their websites against 
Israeli hackers who in the past have defaced them.  In addition, all computers hooked up 
to the Internet are constantly under siege by hackers and script kiddies who 
indiscriminately attack any machine that is vulnerable.  Computers operated by terrorists 
would be no exception.  Thus, we can conclude that terrorists must employ CND or their 
presence on the Internet would not survive.  
Operations Security (OPSEC) 
 
Operations security is the process of identifying essential elements of friendly 
information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations 
and other activities to identify those actions that can be observed by adversary 
intelligence systems, determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that 
could be interpreted or pieced together to derive essential elements of friendly 
information time to be useful to adversaries, and select and execute measures that 
eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to 
adversary exploitation.53
 
OPSEC includes camouflage, concealment, and decoy employment.  It is offensive when 
it is used to protect information about friendly force actions, intentions, and future 
operations from adversaries.  It is defensive when it is used to protect information that 
could be used by adversaries to target or attack friendly forces. 
 
Terrorists make extensive use of offensive and defensive OPSEC.  Their operations and 
organizational survival depends on secrecy.  Underground groups must hide not only 
their plans and operations, but also the places they live and meet.   
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To avoid drawing attention to themselves, terrorists may attempt to dress, act, and talk 
like those around them.  In April 2004, the FBI issued a warning that al-Qa’ida had 
prioritized the recruitment and use of operatives whose background or appearance allows 
them to blend easily into Western society.  The report said al-Qa’ida seeks individuals 
who speak English or are of European ancestry, people who have U.S. or West European 
passports, and naturalized U.S. citizens of Middle Eastern or South Asian descent. These 
groups are perceived to have greater freedom of access in the West.54
 
The al-Qa’ida training manual emphasizes security and integrates it into such topic areas 
as housing, communications, transportation, training, meetings, and operations.  Under 
telephone communications, for example, members are instructed to use phones in public 
places and to use codes or speak in general terms in case their conversations are being 
monitored.  Under apartments, they are told that nobody should know the location except 
those who use it, and that it is preferable to rent apartments using false names, 
appropriate cover, and non-Muslim appearance.  Members are also told to prepare secret 
locations in their apartments for hiding documents, records, arms, and other important 
items. 
 
An entire lesson is devoted to the security plan, which is defined as “a set of coordinated, 
cohesive, and integrated measures that are related to a certain activity and designed to 
confuse and surprise the enemy, and if uncovered, to minimize the work loss as much as 
possible.”  In a section on stationary meetings, members are given a list of precautions to 
follow.  These include wearing clothing suitable for the meeting place, traveling to the 
meeting through secondary places, and using a meeting location in the middle of a group 
of houses, not at the beginning. 
 
In January 2004, al-Qa’ida launched the Internet magazine Al-Battar Training Camp for 
the purpose of giving Muslim youth jihad training without the need to travel to a terrorist 
training camp.55  The sixth issue, published in March, includes a detailed description of 
the organization structure of project cells.56  The issue emphasizes the importance of 
security, including the use of compartmentalization within project cells and dead drops 
(including websites) for communications up and down the chain of command.  Members 
of the project management team are to be trained in secret communications, among other 
things.  Other issues of the magazine also contain articles that discuss security. 
 
Methods for secure communications are covered in a lesson on secret writing and codes 
and ciphers in the al-Qa’ida training manual.  This lesson is particularly archaic, 
however, describing manual methods of encipherment that appear to be at least 50 to 100 
years old.  The manual does not mention modern computer and communication 
technologies and the varieties of secrecy technologies that have been developed for them.  
Yet al-Qa’ida and other terrorists use these technologies, including anonymous e-mail 
accounts, encryption, and possibly steganography. 
 
The September 11 hijackers, for example, accessed anonymous Hotmail and Yahoo! 
accounts from computers at Kinko’s and at a public library.57  They also used secret code 
 12
words and phrases.  Three weeks before the attacks, Mohammad Atta reportedly received 
a coded email message that read: “The semester begins in three more weeks.  We’ve 
obtained 19 confirmations for studies in the faculty of law, the faculty of urban planning, 
the faculty of fine arts and the faculty of engineering.”58  The faculties referred to the four 
targets (twin towers, Pentagon, and Capitol); the faculty for urban planning may have 
represented the World Trade Center tower hit by Atta’s plane since he had studied urban 
planning in Hamburg, Germany. 
 
Al-Qa’ida has used encryption to protect information stored in computer files.  Ramzi 
Yousef, a key operative in the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, stored the 
information about his Bojinka plot to destroy 11 airliners on his laptop in encrypted files.  
The encryption was sufficiently robust that it took cryptanalysts more than a year to break 
the code.59  Yousef’s uncle, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, is said to have trained high-level 
al-Qa’ida operatives in the use of encryption.60
 
After the Wall Street Journal bought two computers from looters in Afghanistan in 
November 2001, they found a treasure trove of encrypted files belonging to al-Qa’ida.  
The files had been encrypted with Microsoft’s 40-bit version of the Data Encryption 
Standard (DES), which had been approved for export (now codes with unlimited and 
unbreakable key sizes can be exported).  Although 40-bit keys are usually regarded as 
extremely weak, it took the Journal five days to crack one of the keys using several 
computers. The files contained memos of the terrorist group’s chemical and biological 
weapons program, justifications for killing civilians, and a propaganda video showing 
people fleeing from the World Trade Center.61
 
Al-Qa’ida also reportedly acquired customized ciphers on the international black market 
around 1996.  The terrorist group encrypted their satellite data communications and used 
hard-to-tap spread-spectrum radios.62  
 
There have been reports of al-Qa’ida members using steganography, that is, methods of 
hiding messages in cover media.63  In October 2001, ABC News reported that French 
investigators believed that suspects arrested in an alleged plot to blow up the U.S. 
Embassy in Paris planned to transmit the go-ahead for the attack hidden inside a picture 
posted on the Internet.  Investigators found a notebook full of secret codes on one of the 
men, who was characterized as a “computer nerd well versed in the messaging 
technique.”64
 
Italian investigators also found indications of al-Qa’ida terrorists hiding messages in 
image files on the Internet.  In November 2001, they confiscated eleven computers from 
the Via Quaranta mosque during an investigation into an Islamic terrorist cell that 
provided logistical support to al-Qa’ida.  The computers held images of the World Trade 
Center (downloaded before September 11), political leaders such as President Bush, and 
pornographic material, all taken from the Internet.  The images had been modified before 
being sent back onto the Web, suggesting that they contained hidden messages.65   
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The Glasgow communications firm Iomart said they had passed hundreds of files with 
hidden Arabic text and date references to U.S. authorities after the September 11 attacks.  
They had found the hidden messages in image and music files on the Internet.66   In July 
2004, the Northeast Intelligence Network reported that their analysis of a re-released 
video of bin Laden uncovered what appeared to be secret codes.  They found alpha-
numeric sequences in some of the frames that were not present in the original video.67   
 
Terrorist-related information has been found hidden on compact disks.  Saudi authorities, 
for example, found hidden files with bomb-making instructions on CDs they had 
confiscated from local computer shops.68  The raids were conducted following a 
crackdown on Muslim militants after the bombings in Riyadh attributed to al-Qa’ida.   
The shops were selling the CDs. 
 
IO SUPPORTING CAPABILITIES 
 
IO supporting capabilities include physical destruction, information assurance (IA), 
physical security, counterintelligence, counterdeception, and counterpropaganda.   
Physical Destruction 
 
Physical destruction is the application of combat power to destroy or degrade adversary 
forces, sources of information, command and control systems, and installations.69  
Although physical destruction primarily serves conventional (non-IO) warfare objectives, 
it becomes an IO element when used to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information, 
information systems, the decision making process, or the decision maker. 
 
Terrorism is generally defined by acts of physical violence and the threat of such acts, 
particularly against civilians.  While these acts are intended to influence decision makers, 
in general they do not involve denying, degrading, or destroying information resources or 
the decision makers.  Rather, the typical terrorist act destroys civilians, in the process 
injecting additional information into the decision making process, namely images that 
portray the terrorists’ power and generate fear.  Terrorists seek to bring their cause and 
capabilities to the attention of decision makers and their populations, and they leverage 
the media for this purpose.  Thus, I do not consider most acts of terrorist violence as IO, 
although I readily acknowledge their psychological elements and influence objectives, 
and their integration with IO, typically through media distribution of pictures taken of the 
violent acts.  The Madrid bombings on the eve of elections clearly influenced the 
outcome, but not by degrading or destroying the election process itself or the information 
and systems used to run it.  Rather, voters went to the polls with images of the carnage, 
memories of lost friends and loved ones, and fear of further attacks, as well as a sense 
that the current government had lied to them by attributing the attacks to the ETA. 
 
Terrorists do, however, engage in certain destructive acts that more clearly fit the criteria 
for IO, for example, assassinations of government leaders, which destroy decision 
makers.  
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Information Assurance (IA) 
 
Information assurance comprises information operations that protect and defend 
information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, 
authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation.  This includes providing for 
restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction 
capabilities.70  IA incorporates CND.  It supports OPSEC by ensuring the confidentiality 
of information. 
 
The section on OPSEC describes how terrorists use various security technologies for 
confidentiality purposes, including encryption.  Encryption can also provide data integrity 
and data and sender authentication, thereby serving a broader IA objective.  
 
Terrorists are also known to use password-protected areas on websites, the passwords 
serving as a means of authenticating those seeking access to the areas and confidentiality 
for the information exchanged within them. 
 
The section on CND notes that terrorists must employ CND to ensure the survivability of 
their networks and presence on the Internet.  Through CND, terrorists are also providing 
IA, including confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and availability.   
Physical Security 
 
Physical security is that part of security concerned with physical measures designed to 
safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, 
and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft.71  
Physical security supports the core IO areas, including OPSEC, as well as other 
supporting areas, including IA. 
 
Many of the security measures presented in the al-Qa’ida training manual relate to 
physical security.  As previously noted, the security precautions for apartments include 
preparing secret locations for hiding documents, records, arms, and other important 
items.  Other physical security measures for apartments include replacing locks and keys 
with new ones, making sure that apartments used for undercover work are not visible 
from higher apartments, and using signs such as opening a curtain or hanging out a towel 
to note that the place is safe to enter. 
Counterintelligence (CI) 
 
Counterintelligence is information gathered and activities conducted to protect against 
espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on 
behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign 
persons, or international terrorist activities.72  The CI mission is to detect, identify, assess, 
counter, neutralize, or exploit hostile intelligence collection. 
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The al-Qa’ida training manual instructs members on CI.73  When going to a meeting 
location, members are advised to make sure there are no enemy security personnel behind 
them or at the meeting place.  When taking public transportation to a meeting, members 
should board and embark at a secondary station, as “main stations undergo more careful 
surveillance.”  CI security precautions for apartments include ensuring that there has been 
no surveillance prior to the members entering the apartment. 
 
Members of al-Qa’ida are also instructed on particular methods of intelligence and 
counterintelligence.  For example, a section on surveillance offers six clues for detecting 
surveillance conducted by car.  These include the surveillance car entering a dead-end 
street, and entering and immediately exiting a parking lot. 
Counterdeception 
 
Counterdeception consists of efforts to negate, neutralize, diminish the effects of, or gain 
the advantage from a foreign deception operation.  It does not include the intelligence 
function of identifying foreign deception operations.74
 
The al-Qa’ida training manual includes a few provisions that relate to counterdeception.  
For example, a section on recruiting agents from enemy camps explains that new recruits 
must be tested to weed out those who may try to mislead.  One way of testing involves 
asking a recruit to provide information that is already known.  If the provided information 
fails to match that which is known, this may be an indication that the person is deceptive.  
Another way of testing involves giving the recruit an opportunity to tamper with work 
documents.  In dealing with agents, members are advised to not receive packages from 
the agents, because they could be booby trapped. 
Counterpropaganda 
 
Propaganda is considered to be any form of communication designed to influence the 
opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor.  It 
can be a mix of truths and lies, including misinformation, disinformation, and opposing 
information.  Counterpropaganda consists of programs of products and actions designed 
to nullify propaganda or mitigate its effects.  It is directed toward the target of adversary 
propaganda and serves to degrade the harmful influence of adversary PSYOP on friendly 
forces and other audiences.75  Counterpropaganda is the responsibility of PSYOP units 
when the target of propaganda is a foreign audience. 
 
Terrorists engage in counterpropaganda to offset what they consider to be propaganda 
from enemy governments.  Al-Qa’ida, for example, turns what the U.S. and West calls a 
“war on terrorism” into a “crusade against Islam” and its own “terrorism.”  In so doing, 
al-Qa’ida attempts to turn Muslims against the West, projecting an image of Muslims as 




This strategy is underscored in an April 2004 audio message purportedly from bin Laden.  
Addressing “our neighbors north of the Mediterranean”, the speaker says: “… we would 
like to inform you that labeling us and our acts as terrorism is also a description of you 
and of your acts. … Our acts are reaction to your own acts, which are represented by the 
destruction and killing of our kinfolk in Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine. … The act that 
horrified the world; that is, the killing of the old, handicapped [Hamas spiritual leader] 
Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, may God have mercy on him, is sufficient evidence.”76   
 
Bin Laden appeals to “honest people” to form a committee and use the media to 
“enlighten European peoples of the justice of our causes, above all Palestine.”  He says 
that contrary to the lies “that we hate freedom and kill for the sake of killing,” their 
killing followed acts of invasion. 
 
IO RELATED CAPABILITIES 
 
Related capabilities consist of public affairs (PA) and civil military operations (CMO). 
Public Affairs (PA) 
 
Public affairs are those public information, command information, and community 
relations’ activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in 
the Department of Defense.77  It makes available timely and accurate information so that 
the public, Congress, and the news media may assess and understand the facts about 
national security and defense strategy.  PA information is intended to be credible. 
 
Terrorists integrate their PA activity with their PSYOP and counterpropaganda, 
addressing both external and internal publics.  While their PSYOP is aimed mainly at 
their supporters and potential supporters plus enemy populations, their PA messages are 
aimed at a broad international audience as well.  As noted earlier, terrorists use a variety 
of media for their messages, including leaflets, magazines, newspapers, books, audio and 
video recordings, radio and television stations, and the Internet.  In addition to 
distributing their own materials directly, terrorists also leverage mainstream mass media.   
They send stories and video clips to newspapers and television stations, and have granted 
interviews to reporters. 
 
Terrorists began using the web for PA in December 1996 when the Tupac Amaru seized 
the Japanese embassy in Lima, Peru.  By the following morning, the group had a public 
website up and running out of Germany.  The site had over 100 pages, which were 
updated using a laptop computer and satellite telephone uplink.78   
 
Tupac Amaru’s website represented a strategic innovation in terrorism, particularly as it 
relates to propaganda and public affairs.  For the first time, terrorists could write their 
own stories and bring their message to a world audience without mediation by the 
established press or interference by the government.  They were not dependent on the 
major newspapers and TV stations to report on their attacks.  The advantage this gave the 
terrorists was immeasurable. 
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By January 1998, there were at least 16 English-language sites representing 14 terrorist 
organizations on the State Department’s 1996 list, according to researchers at Haifa 
University in Israel who scanned the web.  Their January 2002 scan found 29 English or 
Arabic sites from 18 organizations on the State Department’s 2000 list.79  The researchers 
reported that the sites usually included background information on the organization and 
its leaders, founders, and heroes; information on the political and ideological aims of the 
organization; and up-to-date news.  The terrorists justified their violence, saying they had 
no choice owing to their own weakness against an oppressive enemy, and that the enemy 
(e.g., state) was the real terrorist.  When the researchers scanned the web in 2003-2004, 
they found hundreds of websites serving terrorists and their supporters.80   
 
As of October 27, 2003, Internet Haganah listed 65 active websites with affiliations to six 
Islamic terrorist organizations.  These included Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (10 websites), 
al-Qa’ida (24), Hamas (19), Hizballah (5), Hizb ut-Tahrir (4), and Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad (2).  The organization claimed to have gotten approximately 300 additional 
terrorist-supporter websites shut down through their volunteer efforts.81  The Anti-
Terrorism Coalition listed 162 websites and 286 e-mail groups in their database as of July 
12, 2004, although many were no longer active.82
 
Hamas’s primary website, represented by the Palestine Information Center, is offered in 
seven languages, each hosted on a different server and with its own content.  The 
versions include Arabic, English, Farsi, French, Malay, Russian, and Urdu.83  Their 
English site includes news stories, political analysis, Palestinian history, web pages 
devoted to “Zionist terrorism” and human rights violations against Palestinians, photos of 
Palestinians killed in Israeli strikes, and videos (including one that “exposes Zionist 
practices”).  There is also a link to “If Americans Knew,” a website with a claimed 
counterpropaganda mission “to inform and educate the American public on issues of 
major significance that are unreported, underreported, or misreported in the American 
media.”84
 
Al-Qa’ida has been especially active on the web. What was reported to be their official 
website, Alneda.com, appeared after the September 11 attacks.  Representing the Center 
for Islamic Studies and Research, the site was used to publish propaganda and send 
messages to al-Qa’ida members.  The site has repeatedly disappeared and then 
reappeared in different locations.  Additional al-Qa’ida sites have also appeared. 
 
In October 2003, al-Qa’ida supporters in Saudi Arabia launched a website with a 
bimonthly online magazine called Sawt al-Jihad (The Voice of Jihad).85  The magazine 
deals with jihad and the mujahideen in the Arabian Peninsula, and mixes PSYOP into its 
propaganda and news.  The first issue contains an interview with one of the men 
responsible for the May 12, 2003 suicide attack in Riyadh and essays implicitly calling 
for the killing of all Americans.  Later, the website published an audio recording of the 
suicide attack as transmitted through a cell phone, videos showing two of the bombers 
reading their wills less than two weeks before the attacks, and speeches by bin Laden and 
Sheikh Abu Omar Muhammad Al-Seif.86   
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The ninth issue, issued in January 2004, reported on a new film relating to the attack on 
the Al-Muhayya Crusader settlements during Ramadan of 2003.   The “Badr al-Riyadh 
film,” which was posted on the web site for the Islamic Center for Studies and Research, 
shows the attack from its initial planning and training stages through execution.  It 
includes ideological discussions regarding the religious legitimacy of the attacks; footage 
of the suicide bombers training for the mission, making statements, and assembling the 
truck bomb; scenes showing a white truck being spray painted to look like a Saudi police 
vehicle; and footage showing the truck rolling out with the bombers on board, followed 
by sounds of gunfire and the beginning of the explosion.  The tape then goes black.87
 
The eleventh issue, issued a month later in February, further extols the Badr al-Riyadh 
video and emphasizes the importance of propaganda, according to the SITE Institute.88  
SITE reports that the issue claims the film has set the stage for a new phase, where people 
will move from passively sympathizing with the mujahideen to “giving all possible 
support to the mujahideen, standing by them with heart and soul, with prayers and by 
urging sons to become time bombs and heroic commandos against the crusaders and their 
allies…”  
 
Jihad doctrine directs all Muslims to use the media to engage in activities that fall within 
the scope of PA, PSYOP, and counterpropaganda.  Principle 21 of the book The 39 
Principles of Jihad, for example, calls for “publishing the Mujahideens’ activities in 
order to arouse the notion of solidarity and strengthen pride and hope among the 
believers, to praise the ideal of self sacrifice for the sake of Allah and to break the media 
siege imposed by the enemy.”  It suggests several distribution media, including Internet 
websites and forums, distribution lists, and text messaging on cell phones.  Principle 34, 
which calls for “performing electronic Jihad,” also has a PSYOP and public relations 
aspect, advocating “participating in Internet forums to defend the Islam and Mujahideen, 
to preach Jihad and to encourage Muslims to learn more about this sacred duty.”89
Civil Military Operations (CMO) 
 
Civil military operations are activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, 
or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian 
organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile 
operational area in order to facilitate military operations, and to consolidate and achieve 
operational United States objectives.90  It may include activities and functions, conducted 
by the military, that are normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national 
government.  CMO supports both military operations and civil authorities. 
 
Some terrorist organizations engage in CMO to assist their local populations.  Hamas, for 
example, is more than just a militant organization.  It also helps fund schools and 
hospitals, and provide welfare checks to the needy.  In the Gaza refugee camps, the 
organization is said to run every school, hospital, and charity.91  Hamas also uses 
donations to provide financial support to the families of suicide bombers.  The result of 
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Hamas’s CMO is that the organization receives reciprocal support.  The local 
communities become a source of new recruits, money, and protection. 
 
Terrorists cannot engage in substantial CMO, however, in places where they must operate 
covertly to avoid capture.  An al-Qa’ida cell in Miami or London, for example, is not 
likely to help the broad community, although it may help a local Mosque that provides 




Terrorists employ all the IO capabilities of U.S. military doctrine, including the five core 
capabilities of PSYOP, military deception, EW, CNO, and OPSEC, and the supporting 
and related capabilities.  They use IO to support both offensive operations (acts of 
terrorism) and defensive operations (e.g., protecting their hiding places).  They use IO 
strategically in support of broad objectives.  While terrorists do not speak and write of 
“IO,” they demonstrate an understanding of the value and methods of IO capabilities.   
 
Terrorists appear to be particularly adept at PSYOP, PA, counterpropaganda, and certain 
forms of OPSEC and deception, driven by their desire to simultaneously reach desired 
audiences and hide from their enemies.  They recognize the value of various media, 
including the Internet, and exploit it to support their cause.  Terrorists and their 
supporters have a CNO capability, with CNA manifesting itself as “electronic jihad” 
rather than as acts of terror. 
 
Unlike the U.S. military, terrorists are not constrained by laws that prohibit certain 
activities or activities against certain populations.  Terrorists are free to use violence 
against civilian populations as their principle psychological and kinetic tool.  Also, 
civilians who support the global jihad can effectively join and take actions on behalf of 
terrorist groups, for example, engaging in CNA or PSYOP. 
 
Effective counterterrorism requires a thorough understanding of how terrorists operate 
across all dimensions, including the information dimension.  This overview of terrorist IO 
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